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III. JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from a Decree of Divorce entered on June 1, 2006, in the 
Eighth Judicial District Court, by the Honorable John R. Anderson. This court has 
jurisdiction over such an appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3 (2)(h) (2006). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD(S) OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Was it reversible error for the Trial Court to impute income to Mr. 
Anderton, for purposes of child support, without making a finding of "voluntary 
underemployment/5 as required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7) (2006), 
subsection (a)? 
Standard of Review, Issue 1: Whether or not a statue applies to a particular set of 
facts is a question of law, reviewed for correctness.1 The determination of whether or not 
a person is "voluntarily underemployed/' as defined by statute, is a conclusion of law.2 
Legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness.3 As used by Utah's appellate court's 
"correctness" means no particular deference is given to the Trial Court's ruling.4 
lSee Slisze v. Stanley-Bostlitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319 (Utah 1999); State v. Burgess, 
870 P.2d 276, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
2See Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), Add. Ex. 5 
("'[F]inding' on the ultimate issue of voluntary underemployment is in reality more like a 
legal conclusion "). 
3See S.S v State, 972 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Utah 1998); Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 
1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); AX. & R. Wipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const, 977 
P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
4See Orton, 970 P.2d at 1256; Rackley v. Fairview Care Centers, Inc., 970 P.2d 
277, 280 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
1 
As stated by the Utah Court of Appeals in Hall v. Hall "p]t *s w e ^ established that 
where a statute expressly requires a trial court to make a threshold finding before taking 
specified judicial action, the trial court abuses its discretion if it proceeds without first 
making the legislatively mandated finding." Hall, 858 P.2d at 1018, 1024, Add. Ex. 5, 
citing Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722, 724-25 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Issue 2: Assuming it was appropriate to impute income for child support 
purposes, was it permissible to determine the amount to be imputed without entering 
factual findings addressing the factors set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45-7.5(7) 
(2006), subsection (b)? 
Standard of Review, Issue 2: See citations for Standard of Review, Issue 1. 
Issue 3: For purposes of child support and alimony, was the factual determination 
that Mr. Anderton earns an additional $30,000 cutting firewood, beyond his W-2 
earnings, supported by the evidence and by sufficient factual findings? 
Standard of Review, Issue 3: In divorce cases, the Trial Court is accorded 
"considerable discretion in determining the financial interest of divorced parties." Id., at 
1021, citing Alfred v. Alfred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1990). Its decisions are 
reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion. See Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 
1997). So long as the Trial Court exercises discretion "within the standards set by the 
appellate courts," its decisions will not be overturned. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 
421, 423 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
2 
However, a court "abuses its discretion when it fails to enter specific, detailed 
findings supporting its financial determinations." Id. Furthermore, "[findings are 
adequate only if they are 'sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."5 
Issue 4: Were sufficient findings entered regarding the parties' financial 
circumstances to support the order that Mr. Anderton pay $750 a month in alimony? 
Standard of Review, Issue 4: See citations for Standard of Review, Issue f. 
A Trial Court's failure to "consider the financial condition and needs of the spouse 
claiming support, the ability of that spouse to provide sufficient income for him or 
herself, and the ability of the responding spouse to provide the support" constitutes 
reversible error.6 
Issue 5: Was it reversible error to permit a real estate broker to testify regarding 
the value of the parties' marital property, given UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2b-3 (2006)? 
Standard of Review, Issue 5: Whether or not a statue applies to a particular set 
of facts is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See Slisze, 979 P.2d at 319; 
Burgess, 870 P.2d at 279. The Trial Court's interpretation of a statute is also a question of 
law, reviewed for correctness.7 
5Id, citing Alfred, {quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992),Add. Ex.7). 
6Stevens, 754 P.2d at 958, Add Ex. 7, citing Paffel v. Pqffel, 732 P.2d 96, 101 
(Utah 1986). 
7See, e.g. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); County, 
Taylor ex rel. CT. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999); Loporto v. Hoegemann, 
3 
Issue 6: Was a reversible mathematical error made in determining the value of the 
marital home? 
Standard of Review, Issue 6: The Trial Court is accorded "considerable 
discretion in determining the financial interests of divorced parties."8 Its decisions are 
reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion. See Willey, 951 P.2d at 230. "For a reviewing 
court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are 
not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's determination." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah 1994). 
In the alternative, a Trial Court's mistake in computing an award arguably 
warrants reversal of a judgment.9 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A* Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below 
A divorce trial involving the Petitioner, Lana Anderton, and the Respondent, Carl 
Anderton, was held on April 18,2006, before the Honorable Judge John R. Anderson, of 
the Eighth Judicial District Court in Duchesne County. 
370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21,22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); A.K. & &, 977 P.2d at 521. 
%Hall, 858 P.2d at 1021, Add Ex. 5, citing Alfred, 797 P.2d at 1111. 
9Nielsen v. Nielsen, 2000 UT App, 37, nonofficialpublication (Utah Ct. App. 
2000), Add. Ex. 6 (Trial Court erred in its method of calculating the interest awarded for 
arrears in child support and alimony, requiring remand). 
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B. Statement of the Facts 
1. Summary of General Facts and Ruling by Trial Court 
The parties in this matter were married for 26 years. (Rec. 20:22-24). They had 
four children together. (Rec. 20:25 21:01). However, only one was a minor at the time of 
trial, Carly Anderton, who was 10. (Rec. 21:3-6). By stipulation, the parties were 
awarded joint legal custody of Carly, with her father, Mr. Anderton, being awarded 
primary physical custody. (Rec. 3:23-24). Ms. Anderton was awarded parent-time rights, 
subject to the provisions of a safety agreement from a DCFS case. (Rec. 5:24-25, 6:1-11). 
Two of the parties' adult sons live with Mr. Anderton, Adam, who was 18 at the 
time of trial, and Chris, who was 21. (Rec. 170:25, 171:21-22, 172:1). Mr. Anderton 
works as a mud logger for an oil company, and also has a part-time firewood-cutting 
business with his sons Adam and Chris. (Rec. 23:25, 24:1-2, 47:14-18). The parties' third 
adult son, Jeremy, was approximately 26 at the time of trial. (Rec. 50:12-18). Ms. 
Anderton resided with Jeremy in his home. (Rec. 6:14-16, 73:17-18, 204:23-24). 
The Court awarded Mr. Anderton child support for Carly in the amount of $138.00 
per month, to be offset against his alimony obligation to Ms. Anderton. (Rec. 4:10-15). 
Ms. Andertonfs W2 income from her job with the school district, of $1,431 per month, 
was used for the calculation of child support and alimony. (Rec. 71:16-24, 202:13-15). 
Mr. Anderton's W2 income earnings from his mud logging job with an oil 
company, of $35,000 were used. (Rec. 202:8-9). Plus, the Court found that he was 
making an additional $30,000, or "could be" making this amount, from the firewood-
5 
cutting business. (Rec. 202:8-11). Based on those figures, the Court awarded Ms. 
Anderton alimony of $750 per month. (Rec. 205:22-24). 
The Court determined that Ms. Andertonfs relationship with Justin Jackson was in 
the nature of a "short term fling/1 which was not long lasting, did not constitute 
cohabitation, and thus did not preclude an award of alimony. (Rec. 200:21-23, 201:3-4). 
Ms. Anderton did not contest Mr. Anderton receiving the marital home but 
requested equity therein. (Rec. 62:19-25). The Court ordered the equity equally divided, 
and entered provisions requiring the sale or refinance of the home within 120 days. (Rec. 
203:25, 204:1-5). Regarding the value of the home, the Court heard testimony from Ms. 
Anderton5s witness, a real estate broker, and from Mr. Anderton's witness, an appraiser, 
and determined the fair market value to be $175,000. (Rec. 203:14-25). 
The Court entered typical orders regarding health insurance coverage, division of 
related expenses and child care. (Rec. 202:21-25). Mr. Anderton was awarded the tax 
exemption for Carly. (Rec. 211:11-12). The Court equally divided a debt left over from 
the parties5 bankruptcy, a past due tax debt, and Ms. Anderton's retirement account, 
valued at approximately $5,000. (Rec. 213:15-19, 211:9-15). Mr. Anderton was ordered 
to pay a counseling bill for Carly. (Rec. 202:24-203:5). The parties were each ordered to 
pay their own post-separation debts. (Rec. 213:15-19). Finally, the Court awarded Ms. 
Anderton attorney's fees in the eventual amount of $8,137. (Rec. 203:3-6, final amount 
determined at Order to Show Cause hearing held on July 20, 2006.) 
6 
2. Specific Facts, Issues #1 and #2 - Lack of Findings Pertaining to 
Imputation of Income for Child Support10 
1. The Court indicated at the outset of the divorce trial that child support 
would be determined based upon the parties' gross incomes and the child support tables. 
(JRec. 4:9-12, Add. Ex. 8). 
2. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court found that Ms. Anderton's gross 
income from her job was $1,431 per month. (Rec. 202:13-15, Add. Ex. 8). 
3. Regarding Mr. Anderton's income, the Court's findings were extremely 
limited and are set forth verbatim in this section. The Court's first statement was: 
Looking at his income and his tax returns, therefs a lot of deposits coming into that 
C&M account and the other account at Zion's Bank from the wood business. Mr. 
Anderton testified that he had some large expenses and that he had to split and pay 
wages to his boys that helped him. I don't know how many years that went on but 
the tax returns shows after an itemization on it that he suffered a loss in 2004 of 
538 [sic] and that he suffered a loss in the following year of about $1,200, I'm 
sorry, $3,069.00. But this court is aware and knows that in a cash business like 
that the loss is the loss for purposes of taxes but, I think they [sic] are situations 
and I'm well aware of extra income that had, would come through on the basis of 
just the deposits to the account and perhaps cash, cash receipts that weren't put it in 
the bank account. Fm also a little bit confused about why with this oil economy the 
way it is and the company he works for doesn't have more work and I think he 
could be working more hours if he looked around but I don't now [sic]. But, even 
taking his gross income now on his, on his oil field business at $35,000 a year I 
think that I could easily find that he is making in addition of $30,000 a year out of 
that wood business or could be, or could be. I think his capability is in that range. 
(Rec. 2Q1:S-202:10, Add. Ex. 8.) 
10A11 portions of the trial transcript which relate to this issue are contained in Add. 
Ex. 8 for the Court's convenience. 
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4. The record reflects only two other uses of the word "cash," besides the 
above statement, neither of which relate to Mr. Anderton's firewood-cutting business, or 
his income from that business. See index of Rec, p.4, "cash," citing Rec. 23:9 and 39:7. 
5. Ms. Anderton testified, "[w]hat he reports and what he makes is two 
different things." (Rec. 63:4-6, Add. Ex. 8). This is the closest any statement in the 
record comes to alleging the business was a cash business, or involved cash income. 
6. Ms. Anderton introduced one trial exhibit documenting income from 
firewood cutting, Exhibit 8, containing receipts and two "check" payments for firewood 
purchased by Alta Lodge in 2005. (See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 8, Add. Ex. 9). 
7. The Court later adjusted its income number slightly from the amount 
included in the above quote, stating that the total from Mr. Anderton's job, plus $30,000, 
was $63,000 divided by 12, or $5,300 per month. (Rec. 207:21-22, Add Ex. 8). 
8. The only other explanation the Court gave for its determination of Mr. 
Anderton's income were in response to Mr. Anderton's protests, following the above 
ruling. Specifically: 
MR. ANDERTON: Your Honor, that witness has never made more than 
$20,000 a year, never. 
THE COURT: Well, that's what I found based on my experience and 
what we've got here in front of us. 
MR. ANDERTON: . . . but I mean when you're talking about firewood 
and my oil field thing how about if I work around the clock, it's impossible. 
You're talking $30,000 on each job, there's no way I can do that. You're talking 
me working 24 hours around the clock. 
THE COURT: Well do the best you can or find another job. The oil 
field's booming right now-
8 
MR. ANDERTON: Yeah, I'm not going to make more, one of the better 
jobs out there-
THE COURT: You should be making more than $35,000 a year. 
MR. ANDERTON: That's where it's at. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ANDERTON: I've made less, this is the biggest year I've ever had. 
THE COURT: Okay. . . . 
(Rec. 207:23-202:10, Add Ex. 8) 
9. In addition to the Court's oral findings, the Decree of Divorce contains only 
three written findings regarding child support or Mr. Anderton's income - paragraphs 8, 
10 and 14. See Decree of Divorce, Add. Ex. 10. 
10. In paragraph 8, the Court indicates child support will be $138 per month, in 
accordance with the guidelines. No income figures are specified. In paragraph 10, the 
Court indicates the parties will share the cost of Carly's health insurance. 
11. Paragraph 14 is the only paragraph which addresses income, and it simply 
indicates that the court found Mr. Anderton earns $63,600 per year, or $5,300 per month, 
and that Ms. Anderton earns $1,471.00 per month. Add. Ex. 10, paragraph 14.n 
12. To date, the actual Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law have 
apparently not been submitted to the Court for signature by Ms. Anderton's counsel. 
However, the draft of such findings regarding child support and alimony is consistent 
with the oral findings and with the Decree of Divorce, with two minor exceptions: 
nThis figure is slightly different from the Court's oral findings, which indicate Ms. 
Anderton's earnings are $1,431.00 per month (Rec. 202:13-15, Add. Ex. 8). Ms. 
Anderton's Financial Declaration, submitted as Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 9, also reflects the 
figure $1,431. Add. Ex. 19. The tax return submitted by Ms. Anderton as Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit 4, contained in Add. Ex. 23, reflects an income of $17,106, or $1,426 per month. 
The Court's figure of $1,431 will be used throughout the remainder of this brief. 
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A. First, the findings reflect support of $132, as opposed to $138. See 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, contained in Add. Ex. 11, 
paragraph 10; and 
B. Second, the findings reflect income of $65,000 per year and $6,416 
per month for Mr. Anderton, as opposed to $63,600 and $5,300, respectively. Add. 
Ex. 11, paragraph 16. 
3. Marshaling of Facts, Issue #3 - Mr. Anderton's Income from Firewood-
Cutting Business12 
13. Mr. Anderton testified he had been involved in a firewood-cutting business 
off and on for approximately 20 years. (Rec. 24:3-4, Add. Ex. 12). He indicated he and 
his brother initially started the business, and that the two eventually owned a semi-truck, 
several saws, and a log splitter. (Rec. 24:5, 154:7-18, Add. Ex. 12). 
14. At some point over the years, due to a slow-down in the business, Mr. 
Anderton's brother went to work for Steward's Convalescent, where he had an accident 
which nearly paralyzed him. Mr. Anderton sold the business and the truck to give his 
brother his share of the money. (Rec. 154:12-23, Add. Ex. 12). 
15. Several years later, as the parties' three boys grew old enough, they started 
cutting firewood on the side to earn money. (Rec. 154:24-155:9, Add. Ex. 12). Jeremy 
was the first to do this, but by the time of trial he had quit and Mr. Anderton, Chris, and 
Adam were the ones involved. (Rec. 155:3-13, 157:15-19, Add. Ex. 12). 
12A11 portions of the trial transcript which relate to this issue are contained in Add. 
Ex. 12 for the Court's convenience. 
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16. Mr. Anderton explained that the amount of time he spends on his firewood-
cutting business depends entirely on the amount of work he is able to get with his normal 
job. As he stated: "If I'm mud logging [his W2 job] I'm not making any wood. If I'm 
not mud logging I'm making wood." (Rec. 43:23-25, 162:6-163:12, Add. Ex. 12) 
17. At the time of trial, the assets related to the firewood-cutting endeavor 
consisted of a five-year-old one-man chain saw, and a 25-year-old log splitter (Rec. 42:9, 
43:13-15, Add. Ex. 12). Ms. Anderton agreed with Mr. Anderton's description of such 
equipment (Rec. 63:8-11, A/d. Ex. 12). 
18. The Court heard testimony from Mr. Anderton and Ms. Anderton regarding 
income from the firewood-cutting business. The facts from their testimony follow, in the 
interest of marshaling the facts available to the Court in reaching its decision. 
i. Information from Mr. Anderton re: Income from Firewood-
Cutting Business 
19. Mr. Anderton's and Ms. Anderton's joint tax return for 2004 reflects gross 
receipts of $7,000 from the firewood business, and a taxable loss of ($538). 
See Defendant's Trial Exhibit #13, 2004 Tax Return, contained in Add. Ex. 13. 
20. Mr. Anderton's tax return for 2005 reflects gross receipts of $10,220 from 
the firewood-cutting business, and a taxable loss of ($3,069.00). See Defendant's Trial 
Exhibit #14, 2005 Tax Return, contained in Add. Ex. 14. 
21. Ms. Anderton's counsel elicited testimony from Mr. Anderton regarding 
deposits made into his two bank accounts, in an attempt to establish a higher income from 
this firewood-cutting business. (Rec. 25:20-31:6, 32:25-36:5, Add. Ex. 12). Additionally, 
11 
Ms. Anderton's counsel introduced copies of the bank statements as exhibits at the time 
of trial. See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibits 5 and 6, contained in Add. Ex. 15 and Ex. 16. 
22. As reflected in the transcript, the discussion between Mr. Anderton and Ms. 
Anderton's counsel's, about the months and amounts of deposits were occasionally mixed 
up, out of order, and/or a few dollars off. Additionally, because the two of them spoke 
over one another, it is often difficult to tell which month went with which deposit amount. 
23. When sorted out, the numbers from the testimony and the exhibits are 
nearly identical. However, because the exhibits (contained in Add. Ex. 15 and Ex. 16) are 
far easier to review, they are the source summarized as follows: 
A. Deposits, Zions' Bank account, "Carl Anderton C & M Firewood:" 
i. December 2004 - January 2005 $3,178 
ii. January - February, 2005 $9,327 
hi. February - March, 2005 $4,182 
iv. March - April, 2005 $5,881 
v. April - May, 2005 $4,149 
vi. May - June, 2005 $3,235 
vii. June - July, 2005 $2.986 
Total $32,938 
B. Deposits, Zions' bank account, "Chris Anderton, Carl Anderton:" 
i. April - May, 2005 $2,572 
ii. May - June, 2005 $1,710 
iii. June - July, 2005 $5,556 
iv. July - August, 2005 $8,399 
v. August - September, 2005 $5,537 
vi. September - October, 2005 $6,426 
vii. October - November, 2005 $4,799 
viii. November - December, 2005 $5.479 
Total13 $40,478 
This section is totaled for the Court's convenience, as it completes the 2005 one-
year period, when added to the section above. 
12 
ix. December 2005 - January 2006 $4,657 
x. January - February, 2006 $5,849 
xi. February - March, 2006 $9.999 
Total $20,505 
24. Mr. Anderton was asked what portion of the above bank deposits related to 
his wood and tree business. (Rec. 36:8-9, Add. Ex. 12). He indicated he would need to 
look at his taxes, because the deposits included his and Ms. Anderton's income tax 
refunds, as well as his income from his job at Milton Logging. (Rec. 36:12-18, 
Add. Ex. 12). 
25. Mr. Anderton testified regarding the following tax refunds, included in the 
deposits (Rec. 38:4-25, Add. Ex. 12; Add. Ex. 15 p.30, Ex. 16 p.07): 
A. US Treasury Tax Refund, 2/18/05 $4,348 
B. US Treasury Tax Refund, 2/24/06 $2,764 
C. US Treasury Tax Refund, 2/24/06 $539 
26. Additionally, the bank statements specifically reflect the following 
additional tax refunds (Add Exhibit 15, p. 30, and Exhibit 16, p. 5): 
A. Tax EFT, 2/14/05 $999 
B. Utah Tax EFT, 2/17/06 $835 
C. Utah TaxEFT, 2/17/06 $235 
27. According to the parties' joint tax return, signed by both of them, and 
according to Mr. Anderton's testimony, the parties' combined income for 2004 was 
$35,268. (Rec. 153:1-4, IS, Add. Ex. 12; Add. Ex. 13). 
28. According to Mr. Anderton's income tax return for 2005, his income was 
$35,728 (R 152:21-24, 153:1S-19, Add Ex. 12, Add. Ex. 14, line 22). This included 
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$35,087 from Milton Logging, $3,710 in unemployment compensation, and a business 
loss for 2005 of $3,069. (Add. Ex. 14, lines 7 and 19). 
29. Mr. Anderton testified that his W2 earnings from his employment were 
deposited into his bank account. (Rec. 158:24-25, 159:20-23, 161:14-16, Afc/Ex. 12; 
Add Ex. 15). 
30. Mr. Anderton also testified that some of the money in the joint account 
related to deposits of income Chris received working in the oil fields through December, 
2005. (Rec. 161:20-23, , 4 ^ . Ex. 12). 
31. Mr. Anderton testified, and it was uncontroverted by other testimony or 
argument, that expenses for the firewood-cutting business were paid for from gross 
income by dividing the total received by four, with 1/4 going to pay "upkeep," and he and 
the boys each taking 1/4. (Rec. 160:24-161:2, 169 :\3-2\, Add. Ex. 12). 
32. Mr. Anderton testified business expenses: 
My biggest expense is fuel and the fuel expense has almost doubled since 
last year and the year before that I've got, I buy and resale firewood because 
sometimes I don't have the opportunity to do it, depending on if I'm working or 
what not, the kids, they can split and they can stack and they can haul and what not 
but I don't like them running the chain saw because it's a high powered saw. . . . 
Q. And, the money that's been brought in from the wood business, where 
does that go? 
A. It either goes to fuel which is the biggest percentage, parts, saw 
upkeep, chains, permits, from about January up until I would say March it's kind of 
deceiving because what we'll do is we'll go up to Larson's and we'll buy the 
firewood up in the Enola and then turn around and resell it so there's not a big 
amount of profit on that aspect. In the first part of the year from July till 
November we're going down to the BLM and you're buying your wood that way 
and you're making more money but then you're doing more traveling time and so it 
still balances out about the same, it's kind of deceiving is what it is. 
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(Rec. 157:11-19, 160:1-16, Add. Ex. 12) 
33. The parties' 2004 joint tax return, and Mr. Anderton's 2005 tax return, 
itemize similar business expenses to those of which Mr. Anderton testified. In 2005, such 
itemized expenses, reflected on Add. Ex. 14, were as follows: 
A. Advertising $425 
B. Car and truck expenses $58 
C. Depreciation and 179 expenses $4,043 
D. Repairs and maintenance $1,422 
E. Supplies $175 
F. Taxes and licenses $143 
G. Wages $875 
H. Other expenses $6,320 
i. Purchases $1,250 
ii. (Illegible on copy received from court) $1,110 
iii. (Illegible on copy received from court) Fee . . . $265 
iv. (Illegible on copy received from court) $3,166 
v. Miscellaneous $245 
vi. (Illegible on copy received from court) $1,262 
vii. Permits BLM $150 
viii. (Illegible on copy received from court) $39 
ix. (Illegible on copy received from court) $83 
Total $13,461 
ii. Information from Ms. Anderton re: Income from Firewood-
Cutting Business 
34. Ms. Anderton testified "Carl makes good money with the wood business. 
What he reports and what he makes is two different things." (Rec. 63:4-6, Add. Ex. 12). 
35. Ms. Anderton testified that she worked with Mr. Anderton in the business 
for 28 years, receiving and placing orders, setting up deliveries, splitting wood with him, 
cutting wood with him, delivering wood in the truck with him, stacking it and splitting it. 
(Rec. 64:7-19, 139:9-140:2, Add. Ex. 12). 
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36. Later, she testified that when Mr. Anderton and his brother were running 
the business in early years she did not help much because the boys were young. But in 
the last ten years she indicated she had helped when she wasn't working. "Oh, I'd say, 
you know, five or six days a month, I wasn't out there a lot, but - " (Rec. 191:10-192:4, 
Add Ex. 12). 
37. When asked what the business brought in, in a year, "gross?," Ms. 
Anderton testified "probably between, I'm going to say 35 and 45 a year." (Rec. 64:24-
65:2, Add. Ex. 12). She then revised her answer to: A. "$30,000" - Q. Okay. A. "to 
$40,000 a year.55 (Rec. 64:7-65:5, Add Ex. 12). 
38. On cross-examination, Ms. Anderton acknowledged that none of the tax 
returns show $30,000 or $40,000 income from the firewood-cutting business, and 
acknowledged that she had signed the returns. (Rec. 87:3-25, Add. Ex. 12). 
39. However, she also indicated that Mr. Anderton took care of the taxes, she 
didn't really read them, and she just signed them because she "trusted him." (Rec. 87:20-
25, Add Ex. 12). 
4. Specific Facts, Issue #4 - Lack of Court Findings Pertaining to 
Alimony Award14 
40. The Court found that due to the length of the marriage, and Ms. Anderton5 s 
needs, it would be an alimony case, absent the allegations of cohabitation. (Rec. 200:18-
2\,Add. Ex. 17). 
14AU portions of the trial transcript which relate to this issue are contained in Add. 
Ex. 17 for the Court's convenience. 
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41. Regarding cohabitation, the Court found that Ms. Anderton was "on a fling 
with this young guy," but "they never intended to make a permanent home together," 
thus, there was "no evidence to justify [] finding there was cohabitation." As such, he 
ruled it was not "a defense against the alimony." (Rec. 200:21-201:7, Add. Ex. 17). 
42. The only additional oral finding the Court entered regarding alimony, 
beyond the findings relating to income set forth in the facts above was: "I'm going to 
award alimony on the basis of the findings that I've talked about financially. I think 
$750.00 a month.. . ." (Rec. 205:21-24, A/d. Ex. 17). 
43. The Court's sole written finding regarding alimony is reflected in paragraph 
14 of the Decree of Divorce, prepared by Ms. Anderton's counsel, which states: 
14. Consistent with this court's Findings of Facts, the court has found that 
the Respondent, Carl Anderton earns sixty-three thousand six hundred 
dollars a year, or five thousand three hundred dollars monthly ($5300.00). 
the court has found that the Petitioner earns about fourteen seventy one 
hundred dollars ($1471.00) monthly. Further the court has found that the 
Petitioner has monthly financial needs that exceed [sic] her income by at 
least seven hundred and fifty dollars ($750.00). Therefore the court orders 
that the Respondent, Carl Anderton pays alimony to the Petitioner, Lana 
Gean Anderton, in the monthly amount of seven hundred and fifty dollars 
($750.00), effective . . . for the term of 25 years and 5 months or until the 
petitioner remarries or cohabitates pursuant to Utah law.15 
Add. Ex. 10, paragraph 14. See also proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Add. Ex. 11,^16 (substantively identical, with the 
exception of the figures of $65,000 for Mr. Anderton's annual income, 
$5,416 for his monthly income, and $1,400 for Ms. Anderton's monthly 
income.) 
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5. Marshaling of Facts, Issue #4 - Determination of Financial 
Circumstances, for Purposes of Alimony16 
44. Both parties testified regarding their respective living expenses, and 
submitted exhibits related thereto. 
i. Information Re: Ms. Anderton17 
45. Pertinent portions of Ms. Anderton's financial declaration, introduced as 
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 9 and contained in Add. Ex. 19, reflect the following: 
Gross Income $1,431 
Less Insurance -$223 
Less Retirement -$97 
Less Other -$36 
Net Monthly Income $1,075 
Rent $900 
Utilities $400 
Property Tax and Insurance $75 
Food $300 
Clothing $100 
Laundry and Cleaning $50 
Medical, Dental, Glasses $50 
Medical Insurance $100 
Car expense, include insurance $31 
Installment Payments $400 
Capital One $150 
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy $50 
Uintah Basin Medical $25 
Carly Mental Health $50 
Home Depot $75 
Capital One $50 
Entertainment $50 
16A11 portions of the trial transcript which relate to this issue are contained in Add. 
Ex. 18 for the Court's convenience. 
17Evidence regarding Ms. Anderton: Rec. 55:1-58:13, 71:2-11, 73:1-76:8, 77:1-




46. The numbers result in expenses, less net income equaling $1,425, 
47. However, certain reductions were presumably made by the Court, based 
upon its specific rulings. Those items consist of the following: 
A. The Court ordered Mr. Anderton to pay the $50 per month debt 
referred to as "Carly's Mental Health" (Rec. 203:3-5, Add Ex. 17); 
B. The Court ordered the parties to alternate years in which they pay the 
$50 per month Chapter 7 Bankruptcy debt (Rec. 213:17-23); 
C. The Court ordered the parties to divide Carly's portion of health 
insurance, pursuant to statute. (Rec. 202:16-24, Add. Ex. 18). This amount could 
be one of two numbers, based on the following: 
i. Insurance is included twice in Ms. Anderton's statement, first 
at $223, and second at $100. (Add Ex. 19); 
ii. In contrast, Ms. Anderton testified that the cost of her health 
insurance was $197 per month. (Rec. 209:15-17, Add. Ex. 18); 
iii. Ms. Anderton's personal portion of health insurance is one-
half of the above cost, to cover herself, plus one-half of Carly's portion, 
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resulting in an expense of either $242.2518 or $147.7519, depending on 
whether the Court uses the information from Ms. Anderton's trial exhibit, 
or from her testimony; 
iv. These numbers reduce Ms. Anderton's claimed budget by 
either $80.75 or $175.25, depending on which source the Court deems 
accurate. 
48. Mathematically, the above corrections of $50, $25, and $80.75 or $175.25, 
total either $155.75 or $250.25, and reduce Ms. Anderton's need to $1,269 or $1,175, 
again depending on the numbers for health insurance. 
49. Other arguments for reductions in Ms. Anderton's budget are reflected in 
the record. However, as the Court made no findings that such arguments were 
meritorious, and due to the Court's discretionary powers in determining which factors to 
consider, information regarding such arguments is not set forth herein. 
50. Regarding employment, Ms. Anderton testified that she had not taught 
summer school for five years. (Rec. 194:15-17, Add. Ex. 18). The record contains no 
testimony or evidence regarding any other summer employment. 
18Total health insurance premiums reflected in Ms. Anderton's Exhibit 9, Add. Ex. 
19 ($223 + $100), less Ms. Anderton's portion of such insurance ($323 / 2 people * 1.5 to 
provide coverage for herself and half of Carly's = $242.25), results in a $80.75 
correction. 
19Health insurance premiums reflected on Ms. Anderton's budget ($223 + $100), 
less Ms. Anderton's portion of premiums as testified to by her ($197/2 people * 1.5 to 
provide coverage for herself and half of Carly's coverage = $147.75), results in a $175.25 
correction. Plaintiffs Exhibit 9, Add. Ex. 19. 
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ii. Information Re: Mr. Anderton 
51. Mr. Anderton's statement of expenses is contained in Defendant's Trial 
Exhibit 15, Add. Ex. 20. Combined with Mr. Anderton's testimony, such information 
reflects the following: 
House $780 
Truck $302 
Wells Fargo $50 
Moonlake (electricity) $79 
Roosevelt City (water, garbage pickup) $115 
R&RPropane $75 
Uintah Basin TV $52 
Unitah Basis Telephone $64 
Cell One $52 
Dentist $50 
Uintah Basin Medical Center (hospital) $50 
Uintah Basin Medical Group (counseling) $50 
Ashley Valley $50 
Farmer's Insurance $200 
Dex Media (yellow page ad) $26 
Weinsteins & Associates (bankruptcy payment) $50 




Laundry and Cleaning $50 
Truck up keep $120 
Gas average (driving to and from work only) $L000 
Total $4,115 
(Rec. 161:11-21, Add. Ex. IS; Add. Ex. 20). 
20Evidence regarding Mr. Anderton: Rec. 167:9-170:1, Add. Ex. 18, and 
Defendant's Trial Exhibit 15, contained in Add. Ex. 20. 
21Total excludes debt to Joel Barrett as no monthly figure was itemized. 
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52. The record does not reflect any challenges made by Ms. Anderton to any of 
the expenses listed on Mr. Anderton5 s budget. 
53. However, a reduction of $25 is necessary on Mr. Anderton's budget, due to 
the Court's ruling that the parties' bankruptcy debt should be divided in half. (Rec. 
213:17-23, Add. Ex. 18). 
6. Specific Facts, Issue #5 - Real Estate Broker Testimony as to Value of 
Property22 
54. Shar Lynn Benson, a real estate broker in Uintah County, was called as a 
witness for Ms. Anderton. Ms. Benson testified that she had been a real estate agent since 
1987, and a real estate broker since 1998. (Rec. 8:25-10:8, Add. Ex. 21). 
55. The Court, upon Ms. Anderton's counsel's motion to admit Ms. Benson's 
testimony as an expert stated: "Usually a real estate appraiser is qualified as an expert. 
I'm going to let her testify as to her opinion as to market value But, it's going to be as 
a matter of weight and as a real estate broker with twenty years experience." (Rec. 11:8-
11, 13-15,Add. Ex.21). 
56. Ms. Benson then testified that her opinion regarding the market value of the 
home was that it was worth $186,538. (Rec. 12:1-2, Add. Ex. 21). Ms. Benson also 
indicated that the list price she had given Ms. Anderton the prior year was $179,000, but 
that prices had gone up in the meantime. (Rec. 12:12-13, Add. Ex. 21). 
22All portions of the trial transcript which relate to this issue are contained in Add. 
Ex. 21 for the Court's convenience. 
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57. When Ms. Anderton's counsel moved for admission of Ms. Benson's 
comparable market analysis, counsel for Mr. Anderton objected, based upon the fact an 
"appraiser" should testify as to value. (Rec. 13:3-5, Add. Ex. 21). 
58. The Court stated: "I'll note your objection but I've already stated why I'm 
going to let it come in." (Rec. 13:11-13, Add. Ex. 21). 
7. Marshaling of Facts, Issue #6 - Mathematical Error Made in 
Determining Value of Real Estate23 
59. In addition to the above testimony by Ms. Benson, the Court heard 
testimony from Rex K. Cloward regarding the value of the home. Mr. Cloward testified 
that he had been a real estate appraiser for 27 years, and had lived in Roosevelt since 
1970. (Rec. 15:23-16:7, Add. Ex. 22). 
60. Ms. Anderton stipulated to Mr. Cloward being an expert. (Rec. 15:13-19, 
Add Ex. 22). 
61. Mr. Cloward testified regarding his inspection of the home, preparation of a 
market analysis, etc. (Rec. 16:8-17:3, Add. Ex. 22). He indicated he had appraised the 
Anderton home in December 2002, and determined the value to be $120,000. (Rec. 
16:15-16, 17:1-3,Add. Ex.22). 
62. On cross examination, Mr. Cloward was asked to estimate how much of an 
increase in value had occurred subsequent to his appraisal. He indicated he would hate to 
estimate the value without seeing the condition of the property, but when asked to 
23All portions of the trial transcript which relate to this issue are contained in Add. 
Ex. 22 for the Court's convenience. 
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hypothetically assume it was in the same condition as when he appraised it, he indicated 
"I would guess that it's appreciated in value somewhere between 25 and 30%." (Rec. 
17:16-18:22, A&/. Ex.22). 
63. It is undisputed that the balance owed on the home mortgage at the time of 
trial was $66,732.68. (Rec. 22:11-12, Add. Ex. 22, and Trial Exhibit #7). 
64. In considering the above, the Court entered the following oral findings: 
THE COURT: Let's look at the house. I think what we need to do with that 
house I heard from an appraiser, I heard from a real estate broker, both with a lot 
of years of experience. Mr. Cloward appraised the house in 2002 at $120,000, 
asked about the appreciation he thought it would be around $24,000 after two, six 
years, excuse me, four years. So his, his number would be one-hundred and 
sixty-five. Shar Benson's is one-hundred and eight-six; I think it's reasonable for 
me to find that it's worth $175,000. That's the fair market value of that house and I 
need to make that finding to give Mr. Anderton the option of refinancing that 
house and buying her equity out for one-half of that amount on ne t . . . 
(Rec. 203:12-25, Add. Ex. 22). 
65. The Court indicated it was adding $120,000 and $24,000, resulting in 
$165,000 as a market value. However, as a factual matter, these numbers total $144,000. 
VL SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Anderton makes approximately $35,000 annually as a mud logger for an oil 
company. (Rec. 152:8-24). In addition, he earns seasonal money cutting and selling 
firewood with two of his adult sons. (Rec. 154-55). At trial, the Court determined that his 
income from this firewood-cutting business was $30,000 per year. (Rec. 202:5-10). 
However, the Court's determination was inappropriate, based on any one of four 
(4) alternative grounds. First, no threshold finding of "voluntary underemployment" was 
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made, as required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) (2006), for the imputation of 
income for child support purposes. 
Second, the Court's analysis of the "amount" of Mr. Anderton's income did not 
meet the requirements of either of the two arguably applicable subsections of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-45-7.5 (2006). Specifically, subsections (4) and (7), which relate to the 
"imputation of income," and the determination of "business income," respectively. 
Third, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Court's 
ruling, the determination that Mr. Anderton's income from his firewood-cutting business 
was $30,000, for purposes of alimony and/or child support, was clearly erroneous. 
Fourth, the findings required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (2006) and applicable 
Utah case law, for the determination of income for purposes of alimony, were not entered. 
In addition to the above arguments regarding problems with the determination of 
Mr. Anderton's "income," there were insufficient legal findings entered to support the 
award of alimony. Findings must be entered regarding "the financial condition and needs 
of the spouse claiming support, the ability of that spouse to provide sufficient income for 
him or herself, and the ability of the responding spouse to provide the support." Stevens, 
754 P.2d at 958, Add. Ex. 7 (citations omitted). In this case, the limited findings made 
regarding these factors were legally insufficient. 
Finally, the determination of the value of the parties' marital home should be 
overturned, based on either of two grounds. First, a real estate broker was permitted to 
testify, over objection, as to the value of the parties' marital property. This testimony 
25 
violated UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2b-3 (2006) and should be excluded. Second, a clear 
mathematical error, inadvertently made by the Court in determining the value of the 
marital home, should be corrected. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A, The Determination that Mr. Anderton Earns an Additional $30,000 a Year 
Cutting and Selling Firewood, in Addition to His W-2 Earnings, Was in Error 
1. Imputation of Extra Income to Mr. Anderton for Child Support 
Purposes Was Inappropriate, as Mr. Anderton Was Not Found to Be 
"Voluntarily Underemployed," as Required by Subsection (7)(a) of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5 (2006)24 
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) (2006), Add. Ex. 4, a threshold finding 
of "voluntary unemployment or underemployment" must be made before income may be 
imputed for purposes of child support. This section specifically states, "[i]ncome may 
not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing 
is held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) (2006), Add Ex. 4 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the $30,000 figure determined by the Court far exceeded tax return 
information and Mr. Anderton's testimony regarding his income; thus, it constituted the 
"imputation of income." (Rec. 152:21-24, 153:18-19, AM Ex. 13, 14). Mr. Anderton did 
not stipulate to the imputation of income. (Rec. 207-08, 211-12, Add. Ex. 8). Further, 
24AU portions of the trial transcript relating to this issue are contained in Add. Ex. 8 
for the Court's convenience. 
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there was no finding entered indicating that Mr. Anderton was "voluntarily unemployed 
or underemployed,"as required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) (2006). 
In Hall v. Hall the Utah Court of Appeals addressed a similar challenge to the 
findings made by a Trial Court under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) (2006). Hall, 
858 P.2d at 1018, Add. Ex. 5. Mr. Hall challenged the Trial Court's decision to impute 
historic income to him for purposes of child support and alimony. He had been employed 
in a computer business in California at $55,000. Subsequently, he worked for three years 
in Utah as a computer consultant and software developer, making $100,000 a year. 
Approximately ten (10) days before trial, Mr. Hall obtained a job in Washington state, 
making only $40,000. Hall 858 P.2d at 1023, Add. Ex. 5. 
The Trial Court entered detailed findings regarding Mr. Hall's historical income, 
his present income, and his occupational qualifications. Based thereon, his income was 
determined to be $98,499 per year for purposes of alimony and child support. Hall 858 
P.2 at 1023, Add. Ex. 5. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals explained that findings regarding the 
"amount of income to impute" do not become relevant "until after [the Court] 
determines, as a threshold matter, that income should be imputed because the parent is 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, as required by section (7)(a)." Hall 858 P.2d 
at 1024 (italics in original, bolded emphasis added), Add. Ex. 5. 
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The Court of Appeals went on to indicate that "findings on the whole are 
insufficient if they omit critical findings required by the statute."25 Based upon the lack 
of findings of voluntary underemployment, the Hall Court determined that the Trial 
Court's findings were "statutorily insufficient," and reversed and remanded the case. 
Hall 858 P.2 at 1025, Add Ex. 5. 
Just as in Hall in this case there were no findings entered indicating that Mr. 
Anderton was voluntarily underemployed, as required to impute income under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) (2006). The closest the court came to such a finding was 
the following statement: 
Ifm also a little bit confused about why with this oil economy the way it is 
and the company he works for doesn't have more work and I think he could be 
working more hours if he looked around but I don't now [sic]. But, even taking his 
gross income now on his, on his oil field business at $35,000 a year I think that I 
could easily find that he is making in addition of $30,000 a year out of that wood 
business or could be, or could be. I think his capability is in that range. 
(Rec. 202:1-10, AW. Ex. 17.) 
However, this statement is not a "finding" of underemployment, rather, it indicated 
"confusion" about why there wasn't more work; and an indication that the Court 
wondered, but did not know, whether or not he could be working more hours. In fact, in 
considering these questions, the judge specifically concluded, "I don't now [sic]." Id. 
In response to Mr. Anderton's protests to the ruling, the Court also made the 
following comments: 
25Hall, 858 P.2d at 1025, Add. Ex. 5, citing Alfred, 797 P.2d at 1111 (additional 
citations omitted). 
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MR. ANDERTON: Your Honor, that witness has never made more than 
$20,000 a year, never. 
THE COURT: Well, that's what I found based on my experience and 
what we've got here in front of us. 
MR. ANDERTON: . . . but I mean when you're talking about firewood 
and my oil field thing how about if I work around the clock, it's impossible. 
You're talking $30,000 on each job, there's no way I cai} do that. You're talking 
me working 24 hours around the clock. 
THE COURT: Well do the best you can or find another job. The oil 
field's booming right now-
MR. ANDERTON: Yeah, I'm not going to make more, one of the better 
jobs outthere-
THE COURT: You should be making more than $35,000 a year. 
MR. ANDERTON: That's where it's at. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ANDERTON: I've made less, this is the biggest year I've ever had. 
THE COURT: Okay. . . . 
(Rec. 207:23-208:3, 211:24-212:16, Add 17)26 
From the above statements, it appears the Judge thought Mr. Anderton "should" be 
making more money. However, this is insufficient to constitute a finding that a party is 
voluntarily underemployed. Moreover, no evidence, testimony, or argument of 
underemployment is reflected in the record. 
Further, such a finding would be grossly inequitable in this case. Mr. Anderton 
has custody of the parties' minor child, Carly, and the responsibility of caring for her; yet 
he is working two jobs. (Rec. 3:23-24, Add. Ex. 4). On the other hand, Ms. Anderton has 
no such responsibilities, testified she has not worked during the summer for the last five 
26These comments are cited in other sections above but are restated here for the 
Court's convenience in considering this issue. 
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years; and yet the Court did not impute income to her for the three summer months for 
purposes of providing child support for Carly. 
If the facts of this case were reversed and a mother had custody of a child, was 
working two jobs, and had been required to refinance the home to pay her husband his 
share of the equity in a home, it is highly unlikely a Court would tell her she should be 
earning more money. On the other hand, it is also unlikely a Court would tolerate a father 
earning $1,431 per month, taking his summers off, and being paid alimony. 
a. The Lack of a Finding of Voluntary Underemployment Was Not 
"Harmless Error" 
While a finding of voluntary underemployment is statutorily required, admittedly, 
under certain circumstances a decision to impute income without such a finding can still 
be upheld, if the failure can be viewed as "harmless error." Hall, 858 P.2d at 1025, 
Add. Ex. 5. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Hall discussed two such circumstances. The first is 
if "the undisputed evidence clearly establishes the factor or factors on which findings are 
missing."27 The Hall Court determined that this circumstance did not apply in that case 
because there was at least some evidence to suggest Mr. Hall's income level was the 
result of events beyond his control. For instance, Mr. Hall testified that some of his 
clients did not renew certain "lucrative consulting contracts." Hall, 858 P.2d at 1025, 
Add. Ex. 5. Additionally, the Court noted that the parties hotly disputed the adequacy of 
Mr. Hall's efforts to find other employment. Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals held: 
21
 Hall 858 P.2d at 1025, Add. Ex. 5, citing Alfred, 797 P.2d at 1111. 
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Accordingly, because the evidence in this case is not "clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment," we cannot affirm 
on the basis of undisputed evidence in the record. Id., citing Kinkella v. Baugh, 
660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983). 
Similarly, in this case, there is not "clear, uncontroverted" evidence establishing 
voluntary underemployment. Ms. Anderton did not testify, or argue, that Mr. Anderton 
was not working full-time, nor did any other witness. Mr. Anderton testified to the fact 
that he works certain days, then is off while they move his rig to a new location. 
Sometimes it is moved quickly, other times it takes longer. (Rec. 162:12-163:12, Add. 
Ex. 4). Additionally, Mr. Anderton testified that whenever he does not have work at his 
mud logging job, he works cutting firewood and that his income in 2005 was his best 
ever. (Rec. 212:14-15, Add. Ex. 4). 
In short, no evidence before the Court suggested voluntary underemployment. 
Regarding the second circumstance discussed in Hall, the Utah Court of Appeals 
indicated that a Trial Court's decision to impute income can also be affirmed, even 
"absent outright expression of the statutorily mandated finding, if the absent findings 
can reasonably be implied."28 The Court went on to explain that this second exception 
is intended to resolve circumstances where the Trial Court has gone through a detailed 
2SHall, 858 P.2d at 1025 (emphasis added), Add. Ex. 5; see also State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 787-8 n.6 (Utah 1991); Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) ("A finding may be implied if it is clear from the record, and therefore 
apparent on review, that the finding was actually made as part of the tribunal's 
decision."). 
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treatment of the facts related to voluntary underemployment, but has failed to use the 
statutory words. In such circumstances, the required findings can be implied. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in Hall, cautioned: 
Findings may not be implied, however, when the 'ambiguity of the facts' makes 
such an assumption unreasonable. (Citation omitted) . . . [W]e will not imply any 
missing finding where there is a 'matrix of possible factual findings' and we 
cannot ascertain the trial court's actual findings.29 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Hall outlined a number of questions that remained 
unanswered by the Trial Court, making it improper to imply a finding of voluntary 
underemployment in that case. Such questions included whether or not the drop in Mr. 
Hall's earnings was "voluntary," what his abilities were, whether or not his salary was 
"below the prevailing market for a person with his abilities," and whether or not there 
were available job openings for someone with his abilities. Hall 858 P.2d at 1026, 
Add Ex. 5. 
In the case at hand, there was no detailed treatment of the facts and none of the 
above questions were answered. The threshold finding required by the legislative 
mandate of UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45-7.5(7)(a) (2006) was not satisfied, and no proof of 
an implied finding exists. Thus, income should not have been imputed to Mr. Anderton, 
and it was an abuse of discretion to do so. 
29Hall, 858 P.2d at 1025, 1026, Add. Ex. 5, citing Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788, and 
Adams, 821P.2dat6. 
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2. Even Assuming it Was Appropriate to Impute Income, the Findings 
Required to Determine the "Amount to Impute," Under Subsection 
(7)(b) of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5 (2006), Were Not Made30 
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7)(b) (2006), Add. Ex. 4: 
If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation 
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the 
community, or the median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same 
geographical area as found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
Without explanation, justification, or findings related to any of the above factors 
other than work history, it was determined that Mr. Anderton's income from the 
firewood-cutting business was $30,000. (Rec. 202:7-8). No findings were entered 
regarding Mr. Anderton's employment qualifications, nor was evidence regarding such 
qualifications presented by Ms. Anderton. No findings were entered regarding prevailing 
earnings and job opportunities in the area for persons of similar backgrounds, nor was 
evidence regarding such opportunities presented by Ms. Anderton. 
Mr. Anderton's work history was the sole item listed in the statute which was 
discussed, and only to a limited degree. Specifically, Mr. Anderton testified regarding the 
length of time he had worked at his present job, and the length of time he had been 
involved in cutting firewood. (Rec. 24:3-13, 152:13-14). However, there was no 
discussion of his earnings prior to 2004, and the only evidence about 2004 was the joint 
30A11 portions of the trial transcript relating to this issue are contained in Add. Ex. 8 
for the Court's convenience. 
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tax return reflecting a loss. (Rec. 153-54). Admittedly, Mr. Anderton's income for 2005 
was discussed; however, a one-year period does not constitute "work history." 
3. The Findings Required to Calculate "Business Income," Under 
Subsection (4) of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5 (2006), Were Not Made31 
Under UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-45-7.5(4)(a) (2006), contained in Add Ex. 4: 
Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated 
by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business 
operation from gross receipts 
No findings were entered regarding the Trial Court's calculation of Mr. 
Anderton's expenses related to his firewood-cutting business. Undisputed testimony was 
introduced indicating that one-fourth of the gross income from the business was set aside 
for expenses. (Rec. 160:24-161:2, 169:13-21). Testimony was developed regarding the 
nature of such expenses. Tax returns were introduced reflecting such expenses. (Add. 
Ex. 13, 14). However, no findings were made regarding this issue. 
4. The Factual Determination that Mr. Anderton Earns an Additional 
$30,000 From His Firewood-Cutting Business was Clearly Erroneous32 
The factual finding that Mr. Anderton earns $30,000 cutting firewood was not 
supported by the evidence, or by sufficient factual findings, even taking the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Court's ruling. Thus, the use of that number for child 
support and alimony calculations constituted a clear abuse of discretion. 
31
 All portions of the trial transcript relating to this issue are contained in Add. Ex. 
12 for the Court's convenience. 
32All portions of the trial transcript relating to this issue are contained in Add. Ex. 
12 for the Court's convenience. 
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In the fact section related to this issue, Mr. Anderton has marshaled all evidence 
heard by the Court regarding income. Taking from that section the assertions most 
favorable to the ruling, the evidence the Court heard which supports the highest possible 
income consists of two alternative arguments. 
First, Ms. Anderton testified that in her view, the firewood-cutting business 
grossed "A. $30,000 - Q. Okay. A. to $40,000 a year." (Rec. 64:23-24, 65:3-65:5, 
Add. Ex. 12). 
Even assuming this testimony to be true, Mr. Anderton's testimony regarding 
expenses and the equal division of income with his two boys was undisputed by Ms. 
Anderton, by the testimony of any witness, or by the argument of counsel. Specifically, 
Mr. Anderton indicated one-fourth of the income was reserved to cover expenses, such as 
gas for travel to the mountains to cut wood, for delivering wood, for permits to cut 
firewood, for the purchase of wood to fill orders when the family was unable to cut it 
personally, for advertising, etc. (Rec. 160:24-161:2, 169:13-21, Add Ex. 12). The 
remaining three-fourths was divided equally between Mr. Anderton and his two boys. Id. 
Given this undisputed testimony, the absolute most the Court could have 
determined Mr. Anderton earned from this business, based upon the highest number 
asserted by Ms. Anderton, was $10,000 (1/4 of the $40,000 testified to by Ms. Anderton). 
The second alternative argument made by Ms. Anderton's counsel was based on 
Mr. Anderton's bank deposits. (Rec. 25:20-31:6, 32:25-36:5,^^. Ex. 12, Ex. 15, Ex. 
16). According to bank statements for 2005, as summarized in paragraph 23 of the fact 
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section above, a total of $32,938 was deposited into one account, and $40,478 was 
deposited into a second account which Mr. Anderton held jointly with his son Chris. 
Thus, the total deposited in 2005 was $73,416. Id. 
Testimony and exhibits were introduced reflecting $5,347 in Mr. and Ms. 
Anderton's tax refunds, deposited into Mr. Anderton's accounts in 2005. (Rec. 68:4-21, 
Add. Ex. 12, Ex.15, Ex. 16). These funds were not from the firewood-cutting business. 
Additionally, Mr. Anderton testimony was undisputed that his W2 earnings from 
his employment as a mud logger were deposited into his account. (Rec. 158:24-25, 
159:20-23, 161:14-16, Add. Ex. 12). The exact amount of "net" deposits was not 
established, however, Mr. Anderton's gross income was $35,087. (Mr. Anderton's 2005 
Tax Return, Add. Ex. 14). Liberally, at least 25 percent of this amount would have been 
taken out for taxes, leaving a conservative $26,315 which was deposited. 
Also, the deposit exhibits used by Ms. Anderton's counsel reflect multiple 
designated line items for "UT BEN EFT," or unemployment compensation benefits (Add. 
Ex 16). According to Mr. Anderton's tax return for 2005, such benefits totaled $3,710. 
(Add. 14). 
Taking these numbers into account, Mr. Anderton's deposits of $73,416, less tax 
refunds received in 2005, of $5,347, less net W2 earnings of approximately $26,315, less 
unemployment compensation benefits of $3,710 leaves $38,044 in deposits. This number 
must then be divided by four based upon the undisputed testimony that one-fourth went to 
expenses, one-fourth to Mr. Anderton^ one-fourth to Chris, and one-fourth to Adam. 
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Thus, Mr. Anderton's highest possible earnings from the firewood-cutting business for 
2005, based upon the deposits, was $9,511. 
Finally, Mr. Anderton testimony was undisputed that some of the money in the 
joint account he held with Chris came from Chris' earnings. (Rec. 161:20-23, Add. Ex. 
12). However, the amount was not established, thus, specifics cannot be deducted. 
A change from $30,000 to $10,000 in income from Mr. Anderton's firewood-
cutting business would reduce his income for purposes of child support and alimony by 
$1,666 per month. A change to $9,511 would drop it by $1,707 per month. 
As a reality check, if the Trial Court were correct in ruling that Mr. Anderton 
received $30,000 for his one-fourth share of the earnings, it would mean he and his sons 
were earning $120,000 per year in Roosevelt cutting firewood. Yet the evidence and 
testimony reflects that the family took out bankruptcy, their home mortgage was 
delinquent on a number of occasions, and their income taxes reflected a loss from this 
business. These facts do not appear consistent. 
The transcript does not contain any evidence of how the conclusion was reached 
that Mr. Anderton "could be" making $30,000 from the firewood-cutting business. 
Rather, the discussion regarding this matter was fairly general, specifically, the Trial 
Court stated: 
Looking at his income and his tax returns, there's a lot of deposits coming into that 
C&M account and the other account at Zion's Bank from the wood business. Mr. 
Anderton testified that he had some large expenses and that he had to split and pay 
wages to his boys that helped him. I don't know how many years that went on but 
the tax returns shows after an itemization on it that he suffered a loss in 2004 of 
538 [sic] and that he suffered a loss in the following year of about $1,200, I'm 
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sorry, $3,069.00. But this court is aware and knows that in a cash business like 
that the loss is the loss for purposes of taxes but, I think they [sic] are situations 
and I'm well aware of extra income that had, would come through on the basis of 
just the deposits to the account and perhaps cash, cash receipts that weren't put it in 
the bank account. I'm also a little bit confused about why with this oil economy the 
way it is and the company he works for doesn't have more work and I think he 
could be working more hours if he looked around but I don't now [sic]. But, even 
taking his gross income now on his, on his oil field business at $35,000 a year I 
think that I could easily find that he is making in addition of $30,000 a year out of 
that wood business or could be, or could be. I think his capability is in that range. 
(Rec. 201:8-202:10, AW. Ex. 12). 
The Court later adjusted the income numbers slightly, from those reflected in the 
above quote, finding that the total from Mr. Anderton's job, plus the $30,000, was 
$63,000 divided by 12, or $5,300 per month. (Rec. 207:21-22, Add. Ex. 12). 
Regarding the conclusion reflected in the above statement that there was additional 
"cash" income beyond the deposits, there was nothing in the testimony or evidence to 
support this finding. Facts regarding this assertion are marshaled in the fact section 
addressing this issue, paragraphs 4 through 6 above. However, to summarize, neither Ms. 
Anderton nor her counsel made this argument; no witness testified to this effect; and an 
exhibit introduced by Ms. Anderton's counsel reflects checks received from a customer, 
not cash. (See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 8, Add. Ex. 9). 
Alta Lodge was one of three regular clients named by Mr. Anderton. (Rec. 56:22-
57:3, Add Ex. 12). Its firewood purchases in 2005 totaled $1,680. (Add. Ex 9). 
Hypothetically speaking, Mr. Anderton and his boys would need to have 71 clients 
purchasing $1,680 in firewood, like Alta Lodge, to bring in a gross income of $120,000 
per year, and net income of the $30,000 imputed to Mr. Anderton. 
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The only other statements made by the Court regarding the determination of Mr. 
Anderton's income were: 
THE COURT: Well, that's what I found based on my experience and 
what we've got here in front of us. 
• • • • 
THE COURT: Well do the best you can or find another job. The oil 
field's booming right now-
• • • • 
THE COURT: You should be making more than $35,000 a year. 
(Rec. 208:1-3, 212:5-7, 212:10-11, Add. Ex. 17.) 
As explained by the Utah Court of Appeals in Hall a "trial court abuses its 
discretion when it fails to enter specific, detailed findings supporting its financial 
determinations." Hall 858 P.2d at 1018, Add. Ex. 5. The "findings" of a Trial Court 
"are adequate only if they are sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." 
Id. Such detailed findings are required to determine whether the Trial Court exercised its 
discretion in a rational manner. Id. 
In this case, there are no oral or written findings detailing how the decision 
regarding Mr. Anderton's income was reached. No findings were entered regarding the 
portion of deposits attributable to Mr. Anderton's firewood-cutting business. No findings 
were made deducting deposits specifically from other sources, such as the tax refunds, or 
Mr. Anderton's W-2 income. No findings were made regarding expenses of the 
firewood-cutting business. No findings were made regarding the division of income from 
the firewood-cutting business between Mr. Anderton and his two sons. 
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In short, the income imputed to Mr. Anderton's for his firewood-cutting business, 
of $30,000, simply was not justified by the evidence, nor were sufficient findings entered 
to support the Court's determination of that amount. 
B. The Alimony Award in this Case Should be Overturned, Based Upon the 
Lack of Required Findings Pertaining to Mr. and Ms. Anderton's Financial 
Circumstances33 
In determining alimony, a Trial Court has considerable discretion, and its ruling 
typically "will not be overturned absent a showing of a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion."34 However, in exercising its discretion, the Trial Court "must consider the 
financial condition and needs of the spouse claiming support, the ability of that spouse to 
provide sufficient income for him or herself, and the ability of the responding spouse to 
provide the support." Stevens, ISA P.2d at 958, Add. Ex. 7, citing Paffel 732 P.2d at 101. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8) (2006) Add. Ex. 1, codifies the three requirements 
described above and adds others. Specifically, it indicates a Court "shall" consider the 
following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the 
payor spouse; and 
33
 All portions of the trial transcript relating to this issue are contained in Add. Ex. 
17 for the Court's convenience. 
^Stevens, 754 P.2d at 958, Add. Ex. 7, citing Paffel 732 P.2d at 100; and Eames v. 
Fames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor 
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the 
payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
If the Court fails to consider the factors set forth by UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5(8) 
(2006), Add. Ex. 1, and Utah case law, it is an "abuse of discretion." Stevens, 754 P.2d at 
958, Add. Ex. 7, citing Paffel, 732 P.2d at 101. Furthermore, a Trial Court "must make 
findings on all material issues." Id. Such findings "should be sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached."35 
In this case, Ms. Anderton was awarded alimony of $750 per month. In support of 
this amount, the Court found, "I'm going to award alimony on the basis of the findings 
that I've talked about financially. I think $750.00 a month." Rec: 205:21-23, 
Add. Ex. 17. 
The "financial findings" mentioned are those pertaining to income, addressed in 
the Argument, Section A, above. As discussed at length, such findings were insufficient, 
and were not supported by the evidence. 
Moreover, there are not findings related to the other factors a Court is required to 
address in determining alimony. No findings were entered determining the parties' 
respective "net earnings" available to pay expenses. No findings were entered regarding 
the reasonableness of the parties' respective living expenses, or what those expenses were. 
35Hall, 858 P.2d at 1024, Add. Ex. 5, citing Allred, 797 P.2d at 1111 {quoting 
Stevens, 754 P.2d at 958, Add. Ex. 7. See also Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 924 (detailed 
findings are necessary to determine whether Trial Court has exercised its discretion in a 
rational manner). 
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No findings were made regarding Ms. Anderton needs, or what income Mr. Anderton had 
left after paying his expenses, to provide assistance to her. No finding was made 
regarding any extra monthly expense Mr. Anderton would bear as a result of the Court's 
order to refinance the home. Nor was the issue of Ms. Anderton's ability to earn 
additional money during the summer months addressed. 
In short, almost none of the findings required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8) 
(2006) were considered in this case. Thus, the alimony award entered constituted an 
abuse of discretion, and should be reversed.36 
1. There are No Applicable Exceptions Excusing the Lack of Findings 
Required for Entry of an Alimony Award 
There is one exception to the requirement that a court enter findings on all material 
issues related to alimony. However, it does not apply in this case. Specifically, findings 
do not need to be as detailed if the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of judgment. Haumont, 793 P.2d at 425. 
However, for this exception to apply, there must at least be sufficient findings to show 
that the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by the 
evidence.37 Further, the findings must be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
36Haumont, 793 P.2d at 425 (failure of a Trial Court to enter findings on all 
material issues related to alimony, constitutes reversible error); and Paffel, 732 P.2d at 
101. 
31Hall, 858 P.2d at 1021, Add Ex. 5; see also, Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 
(Utah 1986). 
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subsidiary facts to disclose the steps which were taken to reach the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue.38 
In this case, it is absolutely not clear what facts were relied upon, what steps were 
taken, or what findings were made on any of the material issues required for determining 
alimony. The determination was not explained, nor were the steps which were taken 
described. Further, the Court's determination does not appear to be supported by the 
evidence, let alone flow logically therefrom. Additionally, as described above, there are 
no specific or detailed findings regarding net incomes, expenses, or how such amounts 
were calculated. 
It is interesting to note that the Court advised Mr. Anderton that he should be 
making more than $35,000, and imposed obligations upon him based upon an assumption 
he was making $30,000 in extra income. (Rec. 212:1-16, Add. Ex. 17). Yet the Court said 
nothing about Ms. Anderton's income of $17,652, nor did the Court discuss imputing 
income to her, for the purpose of providing child support for Carly, despite her testimony 
she had not worked for the last five (5) summers. 
2. Consideration of the Alimony Numbers Presented in this Case. 
In the fact section above, paragraphs 45 through 47, Mr. Anderton outlined the 
income and expense numbers submitted by Ms. Anderton through her exhibits, deducted 
items the Court ordered him to pay, and reached an alleged unmet need of $1,269 or 
$1,175, depending on the numbers used for health insurance. If income were imputed to 
nHall, 858 P.2d at 1021, Add. Ex. 5; see also, Action, 131 P.2d at 999. 
43 
Ms. Anderton for the three (3) summer months of the year, it would add to her ability to 
meet her own needs. 
Mr. Anderton's gross 2005 W2 earnings were approximately $35,087,39 plus 
unemployment compensation of $3,710, equals $38,797. (Add. Ex. 14). As outlined 
above, Mr. Anderton's highest possible income from the firewood-cutting business, based 
upon Ms. Anderton's testimony (less the undisputed division of earnings with his boys, 
and expenses), was $10,000 for 2005. His highest income based upon Ms. Anderton's 
counsel's introduction of evidence regarding bank deposits (less the undisputed division 
of earnings with his boys, and expenses), was $9,511. 
Based upon the foregoing, the two highest possible total income figures for Mr. 
Anderton, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Anderton, were $48,797, 
or $4,067 per month (using Ms. Anderton's testimony); and $48,308, or $4,026 per month 
(using her counsel's bank deposit argument). 
Mr. Anderton's unchallenged expenses were $4,115 per month, leaving no ability 
to pay alimony. 
C. It Was Reversible Error for a Realtor to be Permitted to Testify, Over 
Objection, as to the Value of the Parties1 Marital Property40 
The parties in this case agreed to Mr. Anderton being awarded the marital home. 
(Rec. 211:11-12, Add. Ex. 21). The Court ordered the equity equally divided, with Mr. 
39Gross income is being used in the interest of being conservative, as the Court 
made no findings regarding Mr. Anderton's net income. 
40All portions of the trial transcript relating to this issue are contained in Add. Ex. 
21 for the Court's convenience. 
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Anderton to sell or refinance the home within 120 days. (Rec. 203:25, 204:1-5, 
Add. Ex. 21). 
Regarding the value of the home, the Court heard testimony from Ms. Anderton's 
realtor (over Mr. Anderton's counsel's objection), and heard testimony from Mr. 
Anderton's appraiser. (Rec. 203:14-25, Add. Ex. 21). Based upon these sources, the 
Court determined the fair market value of the property to be $175,000. (Rec. 203:21-22, 
Add.E7L.2l). 
The Court, sua sponte, raised the issue of Ms. Anderton's realtor not being an 
appraiser, but indicated he would hear her testimony and consider that issue in regards to 
the weight to give her testimony. (Rec. 11:8-15, Add. Ex. 21). Mr. Anderton's counsel 
appropriately objected to the Court accepting Ms. Anderton's exhibit, however, the Court 
overruled his objection, stating, "Yeah, I'll note your objection but I've already stated why 
I'm going to let it come in." (Rec. 13:11-13, Add. Ex. 21). 
According to UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2b-3 (2006), it is unlawful for an individual 
to prepare an appraisal or perform a consultation service related to the value of property, 
unless they are a licensed appraiser. This statute specifically states: 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2) and in Subsection 61-2b-6(2), it is 
unlawful for anyone to prepare, for valuable consideration, an 
appraisal, an appraisal report, a certified appraisal report, or perform a 
consultation service relating to real estate or real property in this state 
without first being licensed or certified in accordance with this chapter.. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2b-3 (2006), Add. Ex. 2. 
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There are certain exceptions to this rule. However, none of them apply to a realtor 
testifying in Court regarding value. The first exception which could be argued is for a 
realtor giving an opinion to a potential buyer or seller as to a "listing price" or "purchase 
price," "in the ordinary course of [his or her] business." UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2b-
3(2)(a) (2006), Add. Ex. 2. However, testifying in Court does not constitute "the ordinary 
course of [] business'1 for a real estate broker. 
The second exception which could be argued is UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2b-3 
(2006), subsection (f), which allows an individual to state an opinion if no consideration 
is paid, and no other party is expected to rely on the appraisal. See UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 61-2b-3(f) (2006), Add. Ex. 2. However, clearly the Court was expected to rely on the 
appraisal in this matter, and presumably consideration was paid, so this exception does 
not apply either. 
D. A Mathematical Error Made in Determining the Value of the Marital Home 
Should be Corrected41 
A Trial Court's findings of fact will be overturned if "clearly erroneous." Young v. 
Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999). A clear math error should be sufficient to meet 
this standard.42 
In his ruling regarding the value of the parties' marital home, the judge stated: 
41
 All portions of the trial transcript relating to this issue are contained in Add Ex. 
22 for the Court's convenience. 
42See also Nielsen, 2000 UT App at 37, nonofficialpublication, Add. Ex. 6 (Utah 
Court of Appeals held that Trial Court erred in its method of calculating the interest 
awarded for arrears in child support and alimony, requiring remand). 
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I heard from an appraiser, I heard from a real estate broker, both with a lot of years 
of experience. Mr. Cloward appraised the home in 2002 at $120,000, asked about 
the appreciation he thought it would be around $24,000 after . . . four years. So 
his, his number would be one-hundred and sixty five [$165,000]. Shar Benson's is 
one-hundred and eighty-six [$186,000]; I think it's reasonable forme to find that 
it's worth $175,000. That's the fair market value of that house." 
(Rec. 203:13-22, Add Ex. 22). 
However, $120,000 plus $24,000 equals $144,000, not $165,000. A math error of 
this nature is simple to make when dealing with a complicated case; however, it 
significantly impacted the Court's ruling, and should be corrected. 
Using the Court's apparent averaging of the numbers from the two witnesses, the 
value of the home using the corrected figures of $144,000 and $186,000, is $165,000. 
Deducting the mortgage balance of $66,732.68, this leaves an equity figure of $98,267 to 
be equally divided as ordered by the Court. 
However, the Trial Court's use of a real estate broker's estimate, over objection, 
was inappropriate under UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2b-3 (2006); thus, Mr. Cloward's 
appraisal of $144,000 should be used. Deducting the mortgage balance of $66,732.68, 
this would leave an equity figure of $77,267 to be equally divided. 
Mr. Anderton believes this second calculation would be most appropriate for the 
following equitable reasons, in addition to the legal arguments related to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 61-2b-3 (2006), set forth above. 
It would arguably have been appropriate for the Court to value the parties' 
property as of the date of Mr. Cloward's first valuation, 2002, at $120,000, given the fact 
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the parties were separated for a portion of the time43 in between then and trial, and given 
Ms. Anderton5s testimony that she did not contribute her paycheck to the marriage 
for two years prior to the date of trial. (Rec. 192:15-24, Add, Ex. 12). 
Also, it would arguably have been appropriate for the Court to allow Mr. Anderton 
to pay Ms. Anderton her portion of the equity in the parties' home after the parties' ten-
year old daughter, Carly, turned 18 years of age. 
Both the issue of valuation date and the issue of when equity is paid, rest soundly 
within a Trial Court's discretion; thus, Mr. Anderton is not challenging those issues. 
However, these facts do at least provide additional equitable arguments for using Mr. 
Cloward's $144,000 valuation of the home from the time of trial, as opposed to the higher 
figure obtained by averaging his appraisal with the real estate broker's estimate. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the determination to impute $30,000 in income to Mr. 
Anderton was inappropriate. No threshold finding of "voluntary underemployment" was 
made, as required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) (2006). Additionally, the 
analysis of the "amount" of Mr. Anderton's income for child support purposes did not 
meet the requirements of subsection (4) or (7) of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5 (2006). 
43The amount of time Ms. Anderton lived out of the home was vigorously disputed 
by the parties, however, even Ms. Anderton acknowledged she was out of the home for at 
least eight months of the two years prior to the parties' separation. (Rec. 80:3-8). 
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Additionally, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Court's ruling, the determination that Mr. Anderton makes $30,000 from this business, 
for purposes of alimony or child support, was clearly erroneous. 
Insufficient findings were entered regarding the factors a Court must consider in 
determining alimony under UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (2006) and applicable case law. 
Finally, the Trial Court's determination of the value of the parties' marital home 
should be modified, based upon the improper admission of evidence, over objection, and 
based upon mathematical error. 
DATED this /V day of May, 2007. 
HUNTSMAN EVANS AND LOFGRAN, PLLC 
DIANA J. ITONTSMAN 
Attorney fqr Respondent/Appellant 
49 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / T day of May, 2007, two true and correct copies of 
this document were sent via first class mail, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
MATT BRIMLEY 
43 EAST 200 NORTH 
PROVO, UTAH 84606 
50 
